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Orientation: Return on the investment in variable pay programmes remains controversial 
because their cost versus contribution cannot be empirically justified.
Research purpose: This study validates the findings of the model developed by De Swardt on 
the factors related to successful variable pay programmes.
Motivation for the study: Many organisations blindly implement variable pay programmes 
without any means to assess the impact these programmes have on the company’s performance. 
This study was necessary to validate the findings of an existing instrument that validates the 
contribution of variable pay schemes.
Research design, approach and method: The study was conducted using quantitative research. 
A total of 300 completed questionnaires from a non-purposive sample of 3000 participants 
in schemes across all South African industries were returned and analysed.
Main findings: Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, it was found that the 
validation instrument developed by De Swardt is still largely valid in evaluating variable pay 
schemes. The differences between the study and the model were reported.
Practical/managerial implications: The study confirmed the robustness of an existing model 
that enables practitioners to empirically validate the use of variable pay plans. This model assists 
in the design and implementation of variable pay programmes that meet critical success factors.
Contribution/value-add: The study contributed to the development of a measurement instrument 
that will assess whether a variable pay plan contributes to an organisation’s success.
Introduction
Key focus of the study
The human resources (HR) function has evolved from an administrative function to the role of 
strategic business partner (Yusoff, 2012). As a strategic partner, HR professionals are expected 
to design, implement and evaluate programmes that meet organisation’s needs. The focus of 
this study was to validate an instrument that assesses the effectiveness of variable pay plans on 
business outcomes.
Variable pay (incentive) plans are used to motivate employees to achieve and exceed business 
objectives. Over the past two decades, the use of variable pay has increased, as have concerns about 
its relevance. Research conducted by Klapow and Borlo (2009) highlighted top management’s 
concerns over the impact of variable pay schemes on companies’ financial results. Given that 
compensation is often an organisation’s biggest expense and therefore impacts profitability, Scott, 
McMullen and Sperling (2006) suggest that senior management should calculate the return on 
investment of incentive pay plans, health care and welfare benefit programmes.
Background
In the absence of empirically validated variable pay measurement tools, De Swardt (2005) conducted 
research on factors required to build an effective variable pay instrument. He formulated a model 
that was founded on motivational theories and consisted of three constructs and 11 dimensions 
that were found to be prerequisites of an outcome-based variable pay plan. His model was backed 
by further studies in this field on the elements required in any variable pay scheme (Greene, 2011; 
Mathis & Jackson, 2008). Notwithstanding the findings of these studies, De Swardt’s (2005) model 
required further validation prior to rollout and implementation in organisations. 
Trends from the research literature 
Motivation theories have been used to explain the behaviour of people exposed to incentive schemes. 
Theories are grouped into schools of thought, which aid in explaining behaviour from different 
perspectives. The model developed by De Swardt (2005) was an attempt to identify the constructs 
Page 1 of 10
Scan this QR 
code with your 
smart phone or 
mobile device 
to read online.
Read online:
Original Research
doi:10.4102/sajhrm.v11i1.464http://www.sajhrm.co.za
and dimensions present in effective incentive schemes. Since 
this study appeared, Mathis and Jackson (2008) postulated a 
model in which they identified 10 factors, which were clustered 
into three themes. The themes are organisation fit, behaviour 
alignment with the intended outcomes and administrative 
factors. Organisational fit consists of factors such as sufficient 
financial resources, alignment with organisational culture and 
the objectives of the organisation. Behaviour alignment relates 
to the relationship between performance measures, the link 
between the measurements and meaningful payouts and the 
desired behaviour to qualify for incentives. Administrative 
factors include clear communication of the variable pay plan, 
the understanding of the rules of the plan and the results 
achieved in terms of the plan. These factors resonate with the 
constructs and dimensions identified by De Swardt (2005).
Greene (2011) identified seven key issues that guide the creation 
of an effective variable pay plan. These are: plan objectives, 
plan types, eligibility, formula to create reward pools, formula 
to allocate funds, payment timing and administration. These 
factors again resonate with incentive pay and confirm the 
findings of previous studies. The latter research was, however, 
not built into a model that could be used to validate incentive 
pay schemes.
Research objectives
Against the background of existing knowledge on variable pay 
models, the purpose of this study was to validate De Swardt’s 
(2005) findings of the three constructs, being: (1) congruency, 
(2) instrumentality and (3) performing and the 11 dimensions 
namely: (1) external alignment, (2) internal alignment, (3) goal 
efficacy, (4) understanding and acceptance, (5) continuous 
improvement, (6) trust, (7) certainty, (8) exclusivity, (9) business 
risk, (10) performance management and (11) performance 
culture and also to measure the reliability of the 78 items of 
the data-collection instrument.
The primary research question was: To what extent are the 
constructs and dimensions identified by De Swardt (2005) 
valid in describing and predicting the outcome of a variable 
pay plan?
The secondary research questions were:
•	 ‘What is the reliability of the 11 dimensions and three 
constructs?’
•	 ‘What are the statistical characteristics of the 11 dimensions 
and three constructs and can they be used to benchmark 
new variable pay plans?’
•	 ‘How reliable are the 78 items as test criteria for the 11 
dimensions and three constructs?’
Contribution to the field
There are no known validated variable pay assessment 
instruments. The value of this research is that it will contribute 
to the validation of the ‘building blocks’ – the constructs and 
dimensions of the model. On completion, the instrument 
will be applied commercially to identify potential flaws in 
variable pay scheme design, indicate potential problems 
during the early and the operational stages of a scheme and, 
finally, allow an assessment of the impact of the pay scheme 
on the organisation’s performance. 
Literature review
Hilmarsson (2009, p. 2) defined motivation as the mental 
force that drives the actions of cognitive beings. In the human 
context, motivation can be either internal or external. Internal 
motivation stems from an internally generated drive, such as 
the desire to do well or to work on interesting projects, whilst 
external motivation is the desire to achieve rewards. Variable 
pay offered by organisations is based on different theories 
of motivation that try to cast light on what really drives 
human behaviour. Hilmarsson (2009) stated that incentive 
ideas stem from theories of motivation and can therefore 
not be fully addressed without understanding motivation; 
hence, the two concepts of motivation and incentives will be 
covered simultaneously. 
This section on literature is structured as follows: firstly, a 
discussion of the evolution of motivation theories (scientific, 
behavioural, content and process approaches) and how they 
have contributed to the design of incentive schemes will be 
provided. This is reported from the early ideas of motivation 
to contemporary thinking. Secondly, existing knowledge of 
current models founded on previous studies is explored, 
with reference to the theories of motivation.
Theories of motivation
One could argue that incentives have been used for a while, 
whether in the form of the proverbial carrot and/or the stick 
– the idea of rewarding desired behaviours and/or punishing 
unwanted behaviours. Hilmarsson (2009) remarked that it 
was during the mid–twentieth century that scientists and 
scholars began to question what really motivated employees. 
Following numerous arguments based on research in the 
manufacturing industry regarding what really motivated 
employees to perform, scientific management emerged. 
Scientific research led to the conclusions that workers are 
motivated purely by money (Turnasella, 2011). 
According to the scientific management approach, workers 
are thought to oppose work and would do as little as they 
can ‘get away’ with. By dividing work into small, easily 
measurable processes, workers could be paid according 
to what they produced. This would increase productivity 
and performance as workers themselves could associate 
the rewards with hard work (Taylor, 1964). Around the 
middle of the twentieth century, psychologists were keen 
to discover what drove workers’ actions. This led to two 
main theoretical schools of thought: content and process 
theories. Content theories assume that factors exist within 
individuals: those energies that direct and sustain behaviour, 
which, when collectively considered, could answer why 
human needs change over time and what it is that motivates 
people. Under this main theory fell such theories as the 
needs theory, the two-factor theory, the X and Y theory, and 
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the existence relatedness growth (ERG) theory, credited to 
Maslow, Hertzberg, McGregor and Alderfer, respectively 
(Hilmarsson, 2009).
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs describes employees as ‘wanting 
animals’ (Conley, 2007, p.8) who have certain needs that 
must be fulfilled. The fulfilment of these needs is stacked 
like a pyramid, with every employee starting at the bottom, 
fulfilling the most basic needs such as food, air and water, 
followed by security and shelter and then love and intimacy. 
In the upper half, there are the needs for self-esteem and 
self-actualisation. The theory claims that once a set of needs 
is fulfilled, a person would strive to achieve the next set, 
with the ultimate aim being happiness and fulfilment in life 
(Maslow, 1954). 
Although Maslow’s theory has been criticised, his ideas 
were the inspiration for much of the research on motivation. 
When translated to the field of employee motivation and 
management, this theory suggests that money is only a useful 
motivator when the person being motivated does not have 
enough of it. This view is supported by Pink (2011), who 
emphasised that financial rewards, and money in particular, 
are strong motivators and effective incentives for jobs 
that are mechanical but not ‘rudimentary cognitive’. Pink 
(2011) stated that once the tasks require cognitive thinking 
(rudimentary cognitive), money loses its motivational effect 
and results in less of the desired performance. His research 
concluded that whilst people must receive sufficient financial 
rewards, other rewards, such as complexity and autonomy 
of the task, become more important motivators of improved 
performance.
Hertzberg’s two-factor theory (Hilmarsson, 2009) claims 
that motivators can be separated into intrinsic and extrinsic 
categories, with extrinsic motivators being those that stem 
from outside the task (referred to as hygiene needs), such 
as money, and intrinsic being those that reside within the 
employee, such as sense of accomplishment (referred to as 
motivator needs). According to Herzberg, intrinsic motivators 
are superior in that they are capable of permanently improving 
employee behaviour. Like that of Maslow, Hertzberg’s theory 
(Hilmarsson, 2009) has also been widely accepted. When 
translated to the field of management and validated by Pink’s 
(2011) ideas, Hertzberg’s theory implies that money can only 
keep employees from being dissatisfied, but cannot keep them 
motivated, meaning that money only motivates to a certain 
extent, at which point other intrinsic motivators are needed. 
Hiam (2002) stated that factors such as interesting work, 
autonomy, responsibility, career growth and a sense of 
accomplishment aid the satisfaction of motivator needs, 
whilst the physical and psychological contextual factors in 
which the work is performed can adversely impact intrinsic 
satisfaction. Hygiene needs are satisfied by factors such as 
pleasant and comfortable working conditions, meaningful pay, 
job security, favourable relationships with other employees 
and effective supervision (Gellerman, 1963).
McGregor’s theory (Hilmarsson, 2009) is strictly work-
related and distinguishes between X and Y employees. This 
theory characterises X employees as inherently lazy, wanting 
only money, whereas Y employees find work interesting and 
demand that organisations offer jobs that match their skills 
capacity. Whereas Maslow holds that employees’ satisfaction 
of needs is hierarchical, Alderfer’s theory (Gellerman, 1963) 
groups employees’ needs into three broader classes. 
Alderfer’s classification explains that the satisfaction of 
employee needs is not necessarily linear. A combination 
of related needs can be satisfied at any given time. This 
means that if different employees are motivated by different 
rewards (not a one-size-fits-all approach), incentive design 
professionals must identify these factors in order to optimise 
employee motivation.
Process theories of motivation describe how behaviour is 
energised, directed and sustained. Lussier and Achua (2012) 
stated that this approach focuses on understanding how 
people choose behaviours in order to fulfil their needs. This 
approach to motivation is associated with expectancy theory, 
goal theory and equity theory, as proposed by Vroom, Locke 
and Latham and Adam, respectively (Hilmarsson, 2009). 
The expectancy theory claims that employee actions are 
dependent on the desirability of the outcome. The action 
with the most desirable outcome will be taken; therefore, 
rather than just answering the question of what motivates 
employees, this theory attempts to answer the question of to 
what extent it will motivate (Vroom, 1964).
Locke (1968) proposed the goal theory, which is similar 
to intrinsic motivation theory. The goal theory holds that 
workers enjoy challenging tasks that require more thinking 
and are further motivated by a clear view of how their efforts 
will lead to goal achievement and reward. The goal theory, 
when applied to management and incentives, demands that 
managers and employees set challenging and stretched goals 
that foster strategic thinking and prompt employees to apply 
their thought processes to find solutions to problems.
Adam’s equity theory (Stoner & Freeman, 1989) is based on 
the premise that a major factor in job motivation, performance 
and job satisfaction is the individual’s perception of the 
equity or fairness of the reward received. An individual’s 
motivation, performance and satisfaction thus depend on 
his or her subjective evaluation of the effort–reward ratio in 
relation to other employees in a similar situation. Applied 
to incentives, this theory is helpful in understanding 
dissatisfaction, as the theory focuses on people’s feelings of 
how fairly they are treated in comparison with the treatment 
received by others (Adam, 1963).
Variable pay methodology
De Swardt (2005) noted the challenges faced by organisations 
in designing, implementing and measuring the return on 
investment in variable pay programmes. He conducted research 
amongst organisations to understand the considerations 
required for an effective scheme. His research empirically 
identified that three constructs (congruency, instrumentality 
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and performing) and 11 dimensions are important building 
blocks in a variable pay scheme. De Swardt’s (2005) study 
intended to help organisations develop a variable pay 
methodology that would enable plan designers to better 
predict the outcome of variable pay. The main objective was 
to improve the effectiveness of variable pay schemes by 
predicting features that should be present, as well as practices 
that might best be avoided.
The results of De Swardt’s study provide a solution that is 
founded on accepted motivational theories, as discussed 
above. As interest in the field of motivation grew and the 
executives of many organisations noted the prevalence and 
importance of variable pay, more clarity on the value-add 
of these programmes was needed. Therefore, De Swardt’s 
research addressed the following key issues related to variable 
pay design and its effectiveness:
How does variable pay create value? What are the ‘building 
blocks’ of variable pay? What role does participant influence 
play in funding and distribution of rewards? Does reward size 
play a role? How does an organisation diagnose the health of 
variable pay plans using the variable pay methodology? How 
can an organisation predict or evaluate plan outcome? What 
are the most common reasons why variable pay plans fail? (De 
Swardt, Veldsman & Roodt, 2010, p. 8)
The results of the research demonstrated that variable 
pay is a not a creator of performance, but that it supports 
organisational performance (De Swardt, 2005). Figure 1 
provides an illustration of the model that summarised the 
dependent variable (scheme outcome) and independent 
variables (three constructs and 11 dimensions).
Variable remuneration constructs
‘Congruency’ refers to the extent and level of understanding, 
or belief in and practice that behavioural changes leads 
to achievement of business goals. ‘Performing’ is the 
extent to which the level of effort is determined, not only 
through rules and policies, but also by a widely supported 
performance culture, leadership and management practices. 
‘Instrumentality’ is the extent to which participants believe that 
they will be rewarded if they perform as agreed. ‘Employee 
involvement’ as a moderating variable refers to the notion 
that the successful design and implementation of any variable 
pay plan hinges on active participation by employees in the 
funding and distribution of payouts (De Swardt, 2005).
Variable remuneration dimensions
The following 11 dimensions were identified by De Swardt 
(2005, pp. 256–280) as requirements for a successful variable 
pay scheme:
•	 Performance management, which is defined as ‘the extent to 
which performance management principles are practised 
in the business’.
•	 Performance culture, which is defined as ‘the extent 
to which the business is managed and led to deliver 
successful outcomes’.
•	 External alignment, which is defined as ‘the extent to which 
the different elements of the business and leadership align 
with the scheme’.
•	 Internal alignment, which is defined as ‘the extent to which 
the internal scheme elements are aligned’.
•	 Communication, which is defined as ‘the extent to 
which information about the scheme and performance is 
communicated’.
•	 Continuous improvement, which is defined as ‘the 
extent to which the scheme is continuously reviewed and 
improved’.
•	 Efficacy/goal difficulty alignment, which is defined as 
‘the self-belief of participants that they will be able to 
achieve the contracted goals’.
•	 Certainty, which is defined as ‘the extent to which the 
game rules are certain’.
•	 Trust, which is defined as ‘the extent to which a trusting 
relationship exists between the participants and the 
custodians of the scheme’.
•	 Exclusivity, which is defined as ‘the extent to which 
participation in the scheme is reserved only for those 
people who make a material contribution to the outcome 
of the scheme’.
•	 Business risk, which is defined as ‘the extent to which 
uncontrolled business risks prevent desired scheme 
outcomes from being attained’.
Additional research has been conducted by other academics 
to identify variable pay factors. For instance, Greene’s (2011) 
research identified seven key issues that guide the creation of 
an effective variable pay plan, notably, plan objectives, plan 
types, eligibility, formula determining award funds, formula 
for allocating funds, payment timing and administration. Yet, 
whilst Greene’s (2011) research added value to this topic, it 
failed to propose quantitatively how the presence or absence 
of any of these seven key elements impacts the success of a 
variable pay scheme.
According to a similar study conducted by Mathis and 
Jackson (2008), the success of variable pay plans is affected 
by a variety of factors. Their model highlighted 10 correlated 
factors, categorised into organisation fit factors, behaviour 
outcome to plan alignment factors and administration 
factors. Organisation fit factors comprised availability 
and sufficiency of financial resources, consistency with 
organisational culture and linkage with organisational 
objectives. Behaviour outcome-related factors comprised 
Participant involvement
Scheme 
outcome
Performance 
management
Performance 
culture
Performing
Predictors of 
scheme outcome
Virtuous/vicious 
relationship
External alignment
Internal alignment
Efficacy/goal difficulty
Understanding and acceptance
Continuous improvement
Congruency
Trust
Certainty
Exclusivity
Business risk
Instrumentality
Source: De Swardt, L.P.V. (2005). The development and validation of a variable remuneration 
methodology. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, 
South Africa
FIGURE 1: Variable remuneration model.
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linkage between performance results and the meaningfulness 
of payouts, the extent to which performance is measurable 
in a fair manner and a relationship between plan design and 
the desired behaviours. Administrative factors comprised 
clear communication of the variable pay plan, current and 
updated variable pay results, clear and understandable 
plan details and a clear separation from base pay. However, 
whilst Mathis and Jackson’s (2008) research contributed 
to the identification of incentive design factors, it failed to 
quantify the impacts of the said components.
Variable pay trends
Research by Zingheim and Schuster (2007) indicated that 
variable pay is not new in the corporate environment, 
although it has lately received much emphasis as organisations 
continue to be subjected to the post-2008 economic challenges. 
Traditionally, variable pay targeted the upper echelons of 
the organisation; however, the ease of its administration 
has led to the inclusion of a greater portion of the workforce 
(Abosch, 2009). There is no doubt that under the prevailing 
economic conditions, performance, whether individual, 
team, or organisational, is key to the sustained existence of 
any organisation.
WorldatWork (2010) noted that companies are seeing the 
value of true differentiation in salaries through variable pay 
rather than traditional guaranteed salary increases, which 
is a view similar to that of Greene (2011), who commented 
that variable pay has stronger motivation potential with 
significant advantages for the organisation. Research by 
Deloitte Human Capital Advisory Services (2012) indicated 
that many organisations are using variable pay as a significant, 
controllable element of their total rewards package. According 
to WorldatWork (2010), whilst salaries were being cut and 
increases were at their lowest in decades, in 2009, the funding 
for variable pay schemes was at an all-time high and many 
reasons were cited for this being the case. WorldatWork’s 
(2010) research revealed that the main reason for changing 
to variable pay is to better align remuneration programmes 
with the business strategy. Abbott and Johnson (2010) also 
revealed that there has been a positive growth in the number 
of organisations offering some form of variable pay below 
the executive level. 
Variable pay plans have a number of advantages, given that 
an organisation must compete for critical skills and cope with 
a turbulent environment. Kovac (2005) stated that variable 
pay reinforces desired performance, aligns individual goals 
with organisational goals, enhances productivity, revenue 
and performance, supports a performance culture enhances 
competitiveness in the labour market and provides financial 
protection for the company. Overall, there is a common 
understanding that current trends, as noted by Greene (2011), 
are in favour of the use of variable pay for top performers in 
order to obtain a competitive advantage.
In recent years, companies have tended to focus more 
closely on the mechanics of incentives, such as performance 
metrics and goals, pay mix and eligibility criteria. Research 
conducted by Ganesan (2012) indicated that companies 
are now becoming much more focused on evaluating and 
measuring the effectiveness of their variable pay policy. This 
trend is expected to continue into the future as more CEOs 
focus on the return on investment in reward (Ganesan, 2012). 
In the research conducted by Greene (2011), one of the 
difficulties associated with administering variable pay was 
found in measuring the competitiveness of plans. With the 
increased attention paid to incentive reward programmes, De 
Swardt’s (2005) model contributes towards laying guidelines 
to successfully address this problem. Given the mounting 
pressure and urgency to justify the continued existence of 
certain human resource projects, such as incentive schemes, 
De Swardt’s model (2005) can help to address this concern; 
however, further validation of the model is needed. In the 
wake of the success and popularity of the balanced scorecard, 
a performance planning and measurement framework 
brought to prominence by Robert Kaplan and David Norton, 
many organisations have taken the step of linking incentives 
to their own scorecards (Wallgren, 2011).
The broad acceptance and use of balanced scorecards are 
largely because of their ‘holistic’ approach to measuring 
business performance, which considers both financial and 
a number of non-financial metrics. This approach assumes 
that performance at an organisational, team, or individual 
level can be measured through four key perspectives: 
financial, learning and growth, internal business processes 
and customers. It stands to reason that the design of an 
incentive plan should extend beyond implementation to 
measurements. Whether this balanced set of measures is 
suited to the employee incentive plan’s design depends on 
the strategy of the organisation. When designing an incentive 
plan, designers need to consider how success will be 
measured, that is, whether financial improvements, process 
changes, people skills changes, or customers will be the key 
indicators of success (Wallgren, 2011).
Research design
Research approach
The research was conducted using quantitative methods. 
Taylor (2005) recommends quantitative research as suitable 
for understanding phenomena by isolating and examining 
the interrelationships amongst and between variables in a 
given setting.
Research method
Research participants
The target group consisted of employees who participated 
in variable pay plans managed by various employers. A 
total of 300 completed questionnaires from a non-purposive 
sample of 3000 participants in schemes across all industries 
were received from 23 participating companies, all of which 
were listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). 
Except for the requirement that respondents should have 
participated in a variable pay scheme, there was no defined 
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sample selection criterion for participating organisations 
in terms of age, industry, race or gender, for example. The 
sampling technique was non-purposive because it depended 
on the employer accepting the invitation to participate. 
Measuring instrument
The instrument used was a five-point Likert scale comprising 
78 items, designed and validated by De Swardt in 2005. This 
instrument was designed to assess participants’ perceptions 
and experiences on various factors of an incentive scheme 
and, as used in the study, was found to be adequately 
reliable in assessing the variables of an incentive scheme. 
The instrument was tested using Cronbach’s reliability 
assessment method. The results of the tests proved that the 
instrument was reliable and measured the intended factors. 
Reliability results are reported in Online Appendix Table 1. 
Only the items of the construct ‘risk’ were reverse-scored for 
ease of interpretation.
Research procedure
Data were gathered using De Swardt’s (2005) 78 item 
questionnaire. The items were grouped under the three 
constructs, namely congruency, instrumentality and 
performing. Participants were requested to score each item 
based on their experience of their organisation’s variable pay 
scheme. Survey results were captured, stored and analysed 
by the University of Johannesburg’s statistical consulting 
services (STATKON). 
The survey link was left open for two months to allow 
participants sufficient time to complete the questionnaire, as 
the questionnaire was deemed lengthy. Electronic reminders 
were sent to participants, encouraging them to complete the 
survey questionnaire and meet the deadline. Communication, 
which included face-to-face sessions, was conducted with 
the representatives to provide background to the research 
objectives and expectations of the survey. The questionnaire 
was designed such that, once completed and submitted, it 
could not be accessed again. 
Statistical analysis
To confirm the structure of the variable pay model’s constructs, 
dimensions and items, a structural equation modelling 
(SEM) approach was followed. To clarify the nature of 
the constructs that influenced a set of responses from the 
participants, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used. To 
test whether a specified set of constructs influenced responses 
in a predictive way, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was 
used. Both the EFA and CFA were necessary to establish any 
correlations amongst the study variables. Before performing 
factor analysis, various probability tests (correlation matrix, 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO-
MSA) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity) were conducted by 
STATKON using the SPSS software program (version 15) 
to establish whether factor analysis could be performed and 
which variables should be included, as recommended by 
Pallant (2007). 
Confirmatory factor analysis
In the present study, the objective was to assess whether 
De Swardt’s (2005) findings are still valid under a different 
sample group. How well the data fit the model was assessed 
by a variety of tests, including:
•	 Normality tests using Mardia’s multivariate coefficients to 
determine or assess kurtosis levels. A normal distribution 
has a coefficient of less than 5.0, whereas a multivariate 
non-normal distribution had a coefficient greater than 5.0.
•	 Model fit assessment using the SEM statistical fit indices: 
Chi-squared test statistics (χ2), relative normed Chi-
squared test statistics (S-Bχ2) with degrees of freedom 
(df), comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA) and modification of variables 
to improve fitness (Byrne, 2006).
Model fit assessment
The RMSEA statistic measures the discrepancy in terms 
of the population and not the sample. It indicates how 
well a model would fit the population covariance matrix 
and is less affected by the sample size. RMSEA values are 
indicated on a continuum ranging from 0 to 1.00, with a value 
of 0.08 and below indicating an acceptable fit, values below 
0.05 indicating a good fit and values smaller than 0.01 
indicating an exceptionally good fit. The acceptable level of 
confidence (CI) used in RMSEA is 90% (MacCallum, Browne 
& Sugawara, 1996). 
Chi-square (χ2) is the most common method of evaluating 
goodness of the model fit and discrepancy between the survey 
feedback and the original model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). As a 
guideline, a value of 0.05 (Barrett, 2007) or less is indicative 
of a good fit. The S-Bχ2 is used as an alternative when the 
value is > 0.05. There is a limitation to the χ2 as it is highly 
sensitive to sample size, especially if the observations are 
greater than 200 (Hair et al., 2003). An alternative evaluation 
of the χ2 statistic is to examine the ratio of χ2 to the degrees of 
freedom for the model (Wheaton et al., 1977). A small χ2 value 
relative to its degrees of freedom is indicative of a good fit, 
whilst values ranging between 2.0 and 5.0 are indicative of a 
reasonably good model fit.
Root mean square residual (RMR) and standardised root 
mean square residual (SRMR) are the square roots of the 
difference between the residuals of the sample covariance 
matrix and the hypothesised covariance model. The range 
of the RMR is calculated based upon the scales of each 
indicator; therefore, if a questionnaire contains items with 
varying levels, the RMR becomes difficult to interpret (Kline, 
2005). The SRMR resolves this problem and is therefore 
much more meaningful to interpret. SRMR ranges from 0 to 
1.0, with well-fitting models obtaining values less than 0.05 
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). However, values as high 
as 0.08 are deemed acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Bentler and Bonnet’s (1980) CFI can overcome the limitation 
of sample size. This index is a revised form of the normed-
fit index (NFI), which takes into account sample size and 
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performs well, even when the sample size is small (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). A CFI greater than or equal to 0.90 indicates a 
good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
The purpose of CFA is to establish the difference between 
the model and a new sample that is tested against the model. 
The NFI assessed the model by comparing the χ2 value of the 
model to the χ2 of the null model. The probability of an error 
in the test is denoted by the alpha (α) value which ranges 
from 0.0 to 1.0. Two levels of significance are used to denote 
the probability of error. A significance level of 0.05 denotes a 
5% chance of being wrong, whereas a level of 0.01 denotes a 
1% chance of being wrong.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The overall mean score was 2.3 with some of the scoring 
concerns related to the mean score being below 1.0, relating 
to questions A26, A72, A76, A77 and A78 with the following 
statements:
•	 A26 – ‘To what extent are practical limitations (e.g. 
feedback on performance) preventing the plan from being 
effective?’
•	 A72 – ‘How difficult is it for you to exceed the performance 
criteria?’
•	 A76 – ‘To what extent are you able to influence the 
performance measures that determine the incentive 
payout?’
•	 A77 – ‘How much opportunity do you have to influence 
the performance criteria of the incentive scheme?’
•	 A78 – ‘To what extent can participants control the factors 
influencing the incentive scheme outcomes?’
The median and modal scores for the sample data were 
both 2.0, whereas the variance and standard deviation both 
fell within the range of 1.0–1.3. The performing construct 
was negatively skewed, instrumentality had a positive 
skewedness and congruency had a positive skewedness. A 
distribution can be mesokurtic, leptokurtic, or platykurtic. In 
this study, 96% of the item’s kurtosis values were less than zero 
(K < 0), indicating that the overall kurtosis had a platykurtic 
distribution (refer to Table 1).
Inferential statistics
Factor analysis
Pallant (2007) recommends performing probability tests 
before assessing the relationship of variables using factor 
analysis. The correlation matrix, KMO-MSA, eigenvalues 
and Bartlett’s sphericity test confirm the probability of 
conducting factor analysis if the results are: KMO index 
> 0.600, correlation matrix > 0.300, Bartlett’s coefficient 
< 0.005 and Eigenvalues < 1.000. 
As illustrated in Table 2, more than 95% of the factor analysis 
results confirmed the possibility of conducting factor analysis. 
The acceptable reliability tests have Cronbach’s alpha values 
interpreted as: > 0.9 great, > 0.8 good, > 0.7 acceptable and 
TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics.
Construct Dimension Item 
number
Mean 
Score
Median 
score
Modal 
score
SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis
1. Performing (11 questions) 1.1. Performance culture 1–5 3 3 4 1.09 1.19 -0.88 0.25
1.2. Performance management 6–11 2 3 4 1.29 1.67 -0.45 -0.76
2. Instrumentality (17 questions) 2.1. Certainty 12–16 2 2 4 1.37 1.87 -0.23 -1.13
2.2. Exclusivity 17–19 2 2 2 1.32 1.75 -0.24 -0.90
2.3. Trust 20–24 2 2 2 1.29 1.67 -0.29 -0.87
2.4. Risk 25–27 2 2 2 1.30 1.70 -0.02 -1.00
3. Congruency (50 questions) 3.1. External alignment 28–39 2 3 2 1.20 1.45 -0.44 -0.56
3.2. Internal alignment 40–50 2 2 2 1.24 1.56 -0.37 -0.71
3.3. Understanding and acceptance 51–67 2 2 2 1.23 1.53 -0.38 -0.72
3.4. Continuous improvement 68–71 2 2 2 1.22 1.49 -0.28 -0.65
3.5. Goal difficulty 72–78 2 2 2 1.20 1.44 -0.04 -0.66
Source: Data collected by authors during present study
SD, standard deviation.
TABLE 2: Scale reliability tests.
Factor Dimension Chronbach’s aplha Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Eigenvalue Variance explained Items deleted or omitted
1.0 Performance management 0.89 0.85 3.76 63% –
2.0 Performance culture 0.78 0.83 2.86 57% –
3.0 Risk 0.83 0.69 2.05 68% –
4.0 Trust 0.72 0.73 2.23 56% A24
5.0 Certainty 0.77 0.76 2.40 60% A14
6.0 Exclusivity 0.72 0.74 2.18 54% A19b
7.1 External alignment 0.87 0.91 2.00 60% –
7.2 External alignment 0.85 0.50 1.66 83% –
8.0 Internal alignment 0.80 0.92 6.55 60% –
9.0 Understanding and acceptance 0.92 0.94 1.29 65% –
10.0 Continuous improvement 0.92 0.77 2.58 64% –
11.0 Efficacy/goal alignment 0.83 0.82 2.99 60% A72, A73
Source: Data collected by authors during present study
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at 0.6 borderline (Pallant, 2007). The KMO-MSA test the 
relationship strength between variables and a minimum of 
0.6 is recommended (Blunch, 2008). A further requirement 
in CFA is an Eigenvalue > 1.0 to retain the variable for 
further testing.
 
Comparing the findings of De Swardt’s (2005) model with the 
results of the present study, the reliability of the sub-scales 
increased after some of the items were omitted. Specifically 
notable were the dimensions of ‘exclusivity’ (three items 
were added in the questionnaire of which one was omitted 
in the validation) and ‘risk’ (the direction of the items was 
reversed). A summary of the factor analysis results, including 
the various tests has been provided in the Online Appendix 
Table 2.
Ethical considerations
The study posed no potential hazards to participants and 
the result of the research was to enrich the existing views 
and knowledge on variable pay schemes in organisations. 
For the purposes of confidentiality, all questionnaires were 
accessed through a secure online link, which was accessible 
only once to a participant to mitigate multiple completion of 
the assessment. 
Trustworthiness
Reliability
The internal reliability of the research questionnaire was 
measured and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.872 (performing), 
0.799 (instrumentality), and 0.971 (congruency) was achieved, 
indicating that the research instrument was reliable.
Validity
The variable pay building blocks attributed to this study and 
assigned to the factor analysis are substantially similar to the 
model developed by De Swardt (2005).
Discussion 
The objective of the research study was to validate whether 
the constructs, dimensions and items designed in De Swardt’s 
(2005) variable pay model are still a relevant in predicting 
variable pay scheme outcome. Factor analysis was therefore 
conducted amongst a sample group to compare the study 
variables, of which the results were subjected to factor 
analysis, as discussed above. The results of the factor analysis 
indicated minimal differences between De Swardt’s model 
(2005) with respect to the reliability of the three research 
constructs (instrumentality, congruency and performing) and 
11 dimensions. The following main findings were revealed:
•	 De Swardt’s (2005) three constructs and 11 dimensions 
are still reliable and valid in measuring the effectiveness 
of the model.
•	 The dimensions and constructs are fairly reliable in 
the current sample, as they were when the model was 
initially designed.
•	 The extent to which the 78 item questions test the three 
constructs and 11 dimensions is still applicable (i.e. reliable). 
However, some changes were identified that will increase 
the reliability of the model. Following the various tests that 
were conducted on the 78 items, 11 dimensions and three 
constructs, 13 items were deleted from De Swardt’s (2005) 
model to improve the instrument’s reliability. Items with a 
test statistics value of less than 0.3 were eliminated as they 
correlated poorly with other items. In deleting items, it was 
ensured that the remaining items were adequate to assess 
the constructs and dimensions. The remaining items are 
sufficient in evaluating the reliability of the variable pay 
constructs and dimensions.
Revised variable pay model
As a result of the modifications to the variable pay model, 
structural changes are evident in the revised variable pay 
model, illustrated in Figure 2. Modifications were made to 
both the constructs and dimensions in order to improve it 
for future commercial application and testing. Overall, the 
model has been confirmed and improved as an assessment 
instrument of variable pay plans. The changes highlighted 
in Figure 2 are:
•	 The integration of the ‘internal alignment’ and ‘external 
alignment’ dimensions to form one dimension ‘alignment’. 
Alignment is made up of items that deal with the 
relationship between the scheme performance criteria 
and business results, the behaviour of participants, 
management support, consistency between daily activity, 
business objectives and the targets set.
•	 The elimination of the dimension ‘understanding and 
acceptance’ and the creation of two separate dimensions, 
‘understanding’ and ‘transparency’. Included under the 
definition of ’understanding’ are the level of participant 
understanding of the rules, structure, calculations, purpose 
and business reasons for the scheme. Under ‘transparency’ 
are the clarity of targets, measurement criteria, assessments, 
payouts and regular communication and feedback.
•	 A number of items included in some of the dimensions 
were removed where SEM justified it. A total of 13 items 
were removed, two were added and a number revised to 
simplify operational assessments.
Source: Authors’ own construction
FIGURE 2: Revised variable remuneration model.
Participant involvement
Scheme 
outcome
Performance 
management
Performance 
culture
Performing
Predictors of 
scheme outcome
Virtuous/vicious 
relationship
Alignment (redefined)
Efficacy/goal difficulty 
Understanding (redefined)
Transparency (redefined)
Continuous improvement
Congruency
Trust
Certainty
Exclusivity
Business risk
Instrumentality
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The revised variable remuneration model resonates with 
the findings of research conducted since the first model 
was developed (Greene, 2011; Mathis & Jackson, 2008). The 
synergies between the three studies are reported in Online 
Appendix Table 3.
The present study shows that the consensus about the 
constructs and dimensions that form variable remuneration 
plans is growing and that future studies to validate the linear 
predictive relationship between the uncontrollable variables 
(the constructs and dimensions and moderator variables) to 
provide a reliable formula to predict scheme outcomes are 
now eminent. 
Practical implications
The research outcome makes a valuable contribution towards 
the empirical validation of a variable pay model. The outcome 
of this research will enable further research validating the 
multivariate relationships between the constructs, the impact 
on business results and the prediction of the effect of business 
outcomes. Finally, variable pay plans are one of the most 
popular methods of determining pay allocation in South 
Africa and continue to receive added focus, particularly 
at executive levels (Seegers, 2012, p. 1). However, some 
academic and professional observers still regard their use as 
controversial. The present research will increase the credibility 
of remuneration models’ impact on the bottom line.
Benefits and applicability of the methodology
De Swardt’s (2005) remuneration model was founded on 
relevant motivational theories and subjected to empirical 
testing. The outcome of this research will enhance the variable 
pay model in the following ways:
•	 The instrument (constructs and dimensions) that project 
whether investment in incentive schemes will affect 
business results has been strengthened, thereby allowing 
design professionals to make the necessary design 
adjustments or completely withdraw the scheme before 
any commitments are made.
•	 The instrument that provides feedback during the 
operational life of the variable pay scheme has been 
strengthened, thereby allowing professionals to rectify 
any weaknesses before any unjustified payouts are due. 
•	 The study assisted with the validation of constructs and 
dimensions. This provides a reliable platform to study 
the interaction between independent variables and the 
dependent outcomes (business results). Therefore it will 
assist in developing an instrument that will improve 
future governance practices.
Limitations and recommendations for future 
studies
Not all aspects of the model were tested during the present 
study. The linear prediction between the independent 
variables and moderator variable (participant involvement) 
and the scheme outcome were not tested. The research 
objectives were to validate the constructs and dimensions 
only. However, this will provide a better platform to test the 
entire model in future.
In quantitative research, the objective is to obtain as much 
information as possible from the participants; however, 
there were limitations that impeded the achievement of 
this objective. The following challenges in this regard were 
experienced. Firstly, it was noted that, because of the number 
of items in the questionnaire, the reliability of participant 
feedback was compromised, particularly towards the end of 
the questionnaire. The effect of this was that the respondent’s 
response quality deteriorates towards the end of the 
questionnaire. Secondly, although the sampled organisations 
were representative of various industries, most feedback was 
obtained from one company. The effect is that the data may be 
skewed and not as representative of all organisations. From a 
statistical perspective, although the SEM approach was used, 
the output generated through the SPSS program is a factor of 
estimating numbers. The researchers are of the opinion that 
future studies should be conducted using a wider population 
group and a wide variety of industries. 
Conclusion
The primary aim of the study was to validate the three 
constructs and 11 dimensions and assess the reliability of 
78 items of De Swardt’s (2005) variable pay model. This was 
accomplished through rigorous testing of the components of 
the model’s constructs and dimensions. This evaluation was 
performed by subjecting the constructs and dimensions of 
the model to SEM to quantify the fit of the theoretical model 
to the test data.
Both exploratory and confirmatory tests were performed, 
as well as multiple fitness tests, to ensure that, theoretically, 
factor analysis was possible. Feedback received from the 
research was analysed through statistical tools and techniques 
– SPSS and SEM (via the EQS program) – by STATKON and 
results were interpreted in relation to the primary model 
under study. Despite differences amongst some of the research 
constructs and sub-scales, overall, the results confirmed that 
the theoretical model is still valid when using the present 
study’s data. The model is therefore fit for its purpose and 
stable to conduct multivariate analysis and validate its linear 
predictability.
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